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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-APPORTIONED AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX
ON AIRPLANES ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and
Assessment, 547 U.S. 590 (1954)
Braniff Airways, an Oklahoma corporation, operated in interstate
air commerce throughout the central United States, including Okla-
homa, making eighteen regularly scheduled stops per day in Ne-
braska. That state imposed upon the flight equipment of Braniff an
apportioned ad valorem personal property tax which the latter sought
to avoid on the ground that the aircraft had no situs in the state. The
United States Supreme Court held that the airplanes had made suffi-
cient contact with Nebraska to sustain that state's power to tax
them.,
The power of a state to tax instrumentalities of commerce raises
constitutional questions under both the Due Process Clause of the
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.2 A con-
tention that a tax discriminates against an interstate carrier presents
the Commerce Clause question.3 When an argument is made, as in
the principal case, that the property taxed has no situs within the
taxing state, the due process question is raised; the constitutionality
of the tax then depends upon whether the property has a situs within
the taxing state.4
As a limitation upon the power of a state to tax the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has applied various
concepts of situs with reference to personal property. The Roman
law concept of situs, which is expressed by the maxim mobilia se-
quuntur personam, regards personal property, wherever it is located,
as being subject only to the law of the owner's domicile." This con-
cept has been applied by the Court in cases wherein states attempted
to levy a tax on the full value of ocean-going steamships engaged in
coastal trade. Accordingly, a non-domiciliary state cannot tax ships
engaged in interstate commerce and only intermittently within its
borders., The power to levy a property tax on the full value of the
1. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assess-
ment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
2. HARTMA, STATE TAxATioN OF INRsTATE CommuROc 13-20 1953).
3. Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (U.S. 1873).
4. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
5. See HARTmAN, STATE TAXATIox OF INTSTATs CommEraC 79 (1953).
6. Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 (U.S. 1872); Hays v. The Pacific Mail S.S.
Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1854). See St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U.S.
1870) (ferryboats operating on Mississippi River between St. Louis and Illinois
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vessels remains with the state of the owner's domicile even though
the ships are never within the boundaries of that state.7
The Roman law fiction is giving way to the modern concept of lex
situs, which regards tangible personal property as being subject to
the laws of the state where it is permanently located regardless of
where the owner is domiciled. A vessel continuously employed in
coastal trade within the borders of one state" is, therefore, subject to
the levy by that state of a property tax on its full value even though
the owner is domiciled within another state.9
Either the Roman law fiction or the modern concept of lex situs
could be applied to sustain a tax levy in cases where the state, at-
tempting to levy a tax on the entire value of instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, is the state of the owner's domicile and the vehicles
are not outside of that state except while engaged in interstate trans-
portation. The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of such a tax
so long as it is not shown that the vehicles are continuously in any
other state.,'
In Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania," the Supreme Court
also decided, without reference to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, - that the instrumentalities of interstate land
transportation may acquire a tax situs in each state through which
they regularly pass, allowing each state to levy a property tax on the
average number of vehicles which are within its borders during the
tax year. As a corollary to this rule, the Court in Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck", held that the acquisition of such a tax situs in other states
shore held not taxable by St. Louis). These cases were not decided under either
the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause but by the application of common
law concepts of situs. See Page, Jurisdiction To Tax Tangible Movables, [1945]
Wis. L. Rsv. 125, 143 et seq.
7. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
8 A vessel carrying goods destined for interstate commerce is itself engagedin interstate commerce although it remains permanently within one state. The
Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (U.S. 1871).
9. Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905). Nor can the
domiciliary state of the owner tax the full value of vehicles permanently lo-
cated outside of its borders. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199
U.S. 194 (1905).
10. New York ex rel. New York Central R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
The Court treated the tax as if it were a propert tax although the New York
statute in question called the tax a franchise tax. Id. at 596. The Court used the
Roman law concept of situs as a basis for the decision. Id. at 597.
11. 141 U.S. 18 (1891); see Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 127 U.S. 117,
123 (1888).
12. The case was decided on the basis of the Commerce Clause and commonlaw concepts of situs, but this rule was followed after the Due Process Clause
was recognized as raising the constitutional point of whether the property taxedhas a situs within the state. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897);
accord, American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
13. 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
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prevents the domiciliary state from taxing the full value of the
vehicles."4
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota," the first case decided
by the Supreme Court involving state taxation of flight equipment,
airplanes flying on fixed routes through eight states were held taxable
for their entire value by Minnesota inasmuch as that state was the
domicile of the owner and it was not shown that the planes had ac-
quired a taxable situs in any other state; on the contrary, they were
only shown to have acquired a taxable situs within the taxing domi-
ciliary state. The principal case, the second decision concerning state
taxation of planes, involves the taxation of that proportion of air-
craft acquiring a tax situs within a taxing non-domiciliary state. The
power of a state to levy such an apportioned ad valorem tax on an
instrumentality of commerce, other than airplanes, was previously
held valid with2" and without reference17 to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The holding in the principal case that
eighteen stops per day in Nebraska were sufficient contact for the
planes to acquire a tax situs within that state is a reasonable appli-
cation of the previous cases."8 The benefits and opportunities of an
interstate air carrier doing business within, and operating through,
a state are no less than those afforded to interstate land and water
carriers.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UsE TAX-JURISDICTION TO REQUIRE OUT-OF-
STATE VENDOR TO COLLECT USE TAX
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)
Maryland's use tax statute requires the vendor, whether he is lo-
cated in or out of state, to collect and remit to the State of Maryland
the use tax on all goods sold to Maryland residents for use in Mary-
land.1 Miller Brothers Company, a Delaware corporation, sold goods
to Maryland residents only at its store in Delaware. Some of the
goods were carried home by the purchasers; others were delivered in
Maryland by Miller Brothers' trucks. This was Miller Brothers' only
14. Nor can a non-domiciliary state tax the full value of vehicles merely be-
cause they have a tax situs within that state. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
15. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
16. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
17. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
18. The doctrine of Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, supra note 13, would probably
prevent the domiciliary state from levying a tax on the entire value of flight equip-
ment engaged in interstate commerce even though the aircraft have a ta, situs
within the domiciliary state if the aircraft are shown to have acquired a tax
situs in other states.
1. MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAws art. 81, §§ 368 to 396 (1951). See especially§§ 368(b), 368(k), 369 and 371. Of course, if the state sales tax has been paid,
the use tax need not also be paid. Id. § 370(a).
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